What to Check When Your Hardware Wallet Arrives
What to check first when you open a new hardware wallet. Built on three real cases (a recovery card with the seed already on it, a tampered device sent by post, and a counterfeit with a swapped chip), the checks cover the seal and packaging, the manufacturer's genuine check, a seed the device makes itself, and the tests to run before you deposit.
When a hardware wallet arrives, most people look at the seal first. If it isn't torn, they relax and switch the device on. Yet in the real attacks on hardware wallet buyers, the seal was rarely the problem. Instead of opening the box, attackers chose the seed in advance, got the owner to type the seed somewhere else, or replaced the chip inside the device.
There seem to be many things to check, but they come down to two questions. Is this device what the manufacturer built? And who made this wallet's seed? The second matters more. A device can pass the first test and still hand your coins to someone else if the answer to the second is wrong.
Three cases that actually happened
In January 2018, someone who bought a Ledger Nano S on eBay lost about $34,000 in coins. The box held a scratch-off recovery card, and scratching it revealed 24 words. He set up the wallet with those words and moved his coins in, and someone who already knew the same words took them. Whether the seller staged it or was duped as well was never established. Ledger said the device had not been hacked, that it had been sold second hand, and that its genuine contents never include pre-written seed words or a PIN.
In June 2021, people reported receiving a Ledger Nano X they had never ordered. They were among those whose names and addresses had leaked in Ledger's 2020 customer data breach. The enclosed letter said the old device had to be replaced for security reasons and told them to connect it to a computer and enter their 24 recovery words into an app. When Ledger examined one, a USB flash drive had been attached to the circuit board, and it launched a fake Ledger Live. The words went to the attackers.
In March 2022, a buyer who got a Trezor Model T from a seller who looked trustworthy on a popular classifieds site lost 1.33 BTC. When Kaspersky took the device apart, it found a different chip in place of the original microcontroller, with traces of soldering. The modified firmware had its signature checks disabled, and when a wallet was created it used one of 20 preset seeds instead of a random one. The words looked like an ordinary recovery phrase, but they came from a list the attackers already held.
The three attacks work differently. The first fixed the seed in advance, the second pulled the seed out of the device, and the third replaced the chip that makes the seed. The checks below block them one at a time.
What to look at in the box
Packaging checks differ by manufacturer. The Trezor Safe 3 ships with a holographic seal over its USB-C port. The seal should be firmly attached with no tears or signs of being reapplied, and peeling it off normally leaves the word VOID behind. Coldcard ships in a tamper-evident bag printed with a number. The Mk4 shows the bag number on its screen the first time it powers up, and the Q and Mk5 show the serial number, so compare it with the number on the bag. BitBox likewise asks you to contact support before using a BitBox02 if the packaging looks cut or resealed.
If a seal or bag looks wrong, don't switch the device on; contact the manufacturer first. But an intact seal doesn't settle the matter. A seal tells you whether the box was opened. It says nothing about whether the chip inside is genuine. A device built as a counterfeit from the start, like the fake Trezor in 2022, never needed its box opened and closed again.
Where you buy is decided before any of this. Buy a new unit from the manufacturer's own site or from a reseller the manufacturer lists as authorized. The 2018 and 2022 cases both began with second-hand sales. A used hardware wallet may have been reset, but there is practically no way to confirm that its chip and firmware were never touched.
The chip answers whether the device is genuine
Most hardware wallets today let the manufacturer's app check authenticity cryptographically. The idea is similar across brands. At the factory, an attestation key signed by the manufacturer goes into the secure chip. The app sends a random challenge, the device signs it, and the app checks that signature against the manufacturer's certificate. A device with a swapped chip can't produce that signature.
- Ledger's Genuine Check in Ledger Live confirms that the device's public key was signed by Ledger's HSM and that the device's response to the challenge is valid.
- On the Trezor Safe series, Trezor Suite runs an authenticity check during setup using a certificate stored in the secure element (OPTIGA Trust M). The Safe 3 ships without firmware; Trezor Suite installs signed firmware, and from then on the device accepts only firmware signed by SatoshiLabs.
- With the BitBox02, BitBoxApp asks the device to sign a random challenge every time it is used, and shows a red warning if the response doesn't check out.
There is one gap in all of this: the app does the checking. If the app is fake, so is the result. Counterfeit Ledgers sold on a Chinese online marketplace came with a QR code that led to a fake Ledger Live, and that app displayed a screen saying the device had passed the genuine check. In the 2021 mail case, the fake app ran from the flash drive inside the device. Get the app from the manufacturer's site by typing its address into the address bar yourself, not from a leaflet or QR code in the box. Some apps also have a setting that turns the authenticity check off; if you run official firmware, leave it on.
Passing the genuine check does not prove nobody has touched the device, and BitBox says so explicitly. Still, a device whose chip was replaced outright, as in 2022, is caught here.
The device has to make the seed, now
The most important rule is a single one: the seed must be generated by the device itself at the moment you first set it up, and shown on the device's own screen. Several judgments follow directly from it.
- The recovery card in the box should be blank. If it has words on it, or a scratch-off panel, don't use the device. That was the 2018 case.
- If the device already has a PIN set or a wallet created when you first power it on, it isn't new. The normal first screen asks whether you want to create a new wallet or recover an existing one.
- Any instruction to enter your recovery words into a computer, phone or website is an attack, without exception. Receiving a new device never involves entering recovery words. That was the 2021 case.
- Treat a leaflet that steers you toward "recover existing wallet" during first setup with the same suspicion. A new device starts by creating a new wallet.
This rule alone would not have stopped the 2022 case. That device showed the seed on its screen, and the setup looked normal, because the chip that generated the seed was fake. That is why the genuine check in the previous section and the rule in this one are both needed. One verifies the chip that makes the seed; the other keeps the seed it made from leaking anywhere else.
Don't photograph the seed you wrote down or copy it into a cloud note. Wherever the seed sits outside the device screen, that place becomes the wallet. Decide separately where and how to store your seed phrase.
What to try before depositing
Once setup is finished, run one small round trip before putting real money in.
- Display the receiving address on the hardware wallet's screen as well as the computer's, and check that the two match from start to finish. Malware on the computer can change the address on the computer screen, but it can't change what the device displays.
- Receive a small amount at that address.
- Send that small amount on to another address. Check the destination, amount and fee on the device screen and sign on the device. This shows that signing works and that the coins leave the way you confirmed.
- Check that the recovery words you wrote down are correct. Many devices have a feature for this, such as Trezor Suite's Check backup, which compares the words on the device without wiping the wallet.
The fourth step is the one people skip. If you wrote one word down wrong, you find out on the day you lose the device, and on that day there is nothing left to fix.
Summary
- Buy a new unit from the official site or an authorized reseller. Don't use a second-hand device, even a reset one.
- Check the seal and the bag number, and contact the manufacturer before switching on if anything looks wrong. An intact seal does not mean the chip is genuine.
- Download the manufacturer's app from its official site by typing the address yourself, and run the genuine check with that app.
- The device must generate the seed now and show it on its own screen. A card with words on it, a device that is already set up, or a request to type in recovery words is each a reason to stop right there.
- Before depositing real money, compare the address on the device screen, receive and send a small amount, and check your recovery words.
A hardware wallet keeps your keys off the computer, but it can't vouch for who made those keys in the first place. The first half hour after you open the box does that job. To choose a device, see the hardware wallet comparison; to keep the device in a drawer while still seeing your balance, see the watch-only wallet guide.